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Abstract: Individuative Realism is the thesis that reality is individ-
uated intrinsically—that is, that there exist some objects and/or 
kinds of objects that are circumscribed by boundaries that are 
totally independent of our gerrymandering. If this thesis is true, 
then how do we determine which individuation schemes cut 
reality at its inherent joints? Since our individuation schemes 
cannot be compared directly with the way reality is individu-
ated intrinsically without begging the question about the latter, 
some philosophers argue that a match can only be determined 
indirecdy, in virtue of an independent criterion. This paper 
considers a few proposed independent criteria and finds them 
wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting that such an inde-
pendent criterion is unattainable in principle. 
Introduction 
A metaphysical thesis which enjoys sustained interest among 
philosophers is that reality is individuated intrinsically—that is, that 
there exist some objects and/or kinds of objects that are circum-
scribed by boundaries wholly independent of where we draw the 
lines. Though this thesis is often labeled 'Metaphysical Realism', the 
label has come to signify a variety of positions, and is thereby worth 
avoiding. So let us give the aforementioned thesis a new name: Indi-
viduative Realism. The claim is that the natural world is individuated 
on its own, irrespective of our carving schemes. 
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If it is true that reality is individuated intrinsically, then we might 
want to know how reality is individuated intrinsically—that is, what 
the objects are into which reality is ultimately divided. For instance, 
is a bunch of ten bananas ultimately one thing, or ten things, or mil-
lions of things (corresponding to the number of atoms comprising 
the bunch)? The Individuative Realist wants to know. A 'direct' strat-
egy for determining how reality is individuated intrinsically is sim-
ply to carve into reality and see where the inherent joints actually 
are—that is, to go hunting for crisp, unambiguous boundaries. The 
primary problem with the direct approach is that the closer individ-
ual objects are examined, the blurrier their boundaries appear, and 
the bizarre entities at the quantum level might not even be individua-
table. In addition to these practical problems, there looms a perhaps 
larger theoretical problem for the direct approach. Even if objects 
with razor sharp boundaries were discovered, there is the episte-
mological problem of verifying that they are the inherently natural 
objects, rather than amalgamations of smaller, albeit more inher-
ently natural, objects. It would seem that any individuation scheme 
could always admit of finer individuation. How might one adjudicate 
between the various permutations of individuation schemes?1 
The Individuative Realist aspires to find a match between our 
individuation schemes and the way reality is individuated intrinsi-
cally; but this cannot simply be a matter of comparing the two sides, 
since one of the sides—how reality is individuated intrinsically—is not 
known antecedently. The challenge faced by the Individuative Real-
ist seems analogous to the challenge of finding a match between a 
key and keyhole. It is not possible to determine a match between key 
and keyhole by visually comparing the two, because the inside of the 
keyhole is not visible. Rather, a match is best determined indirectly, 
by looking for something else which signifies a match—namely, the 
unlatching of the lock. The unlatching of the lock is an independent 
criterion for determining a match between key and keyhole. If a key 
is inserted into the keyhole, and the lock opens, then the key matches 
the keyhole. Some philosophers think that a match between our indi-
viduation schemes and the way reality is individuated intrinsically 
1 For an analysis of the 'direct' strategy and its challenges see Sam Page, 
"The Challenge of Observing Reality's Inherent Joints", Kriterion, no. 20 
(2006), pp. 22-28. 
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can also only be determined indirectly, by appeal to an independent 
criterion, rather than by direct comparison. 
As another example, imagine that people disagree about the 
length of something. How could their rival measurements be adju-
dicated? By consulting an independent, objective standard, which in 
this case would be a measuring device of some kind. A measuring 
device, such as a meter stick or tape measure, is an independent 
criterion for determining length. It is an 'independent' criterion (or 
'objective' standard) because it is independent of our subjective judg-
ments. Now, is there an independent criterion for determining which 
of our individuation schemes cut reality at its inherent joints? 
This paper critically considers the indirect approach for deter-
mining how reality is individuated intrinsically by examining a few 
proposals for independent criteria. One account, covered in Part A, 
is that reality is ultimately individuated by elite properties. Accord-
ing to this account, knowledge of certain elite properties can get 
us to knowledge of reality's inherent joints. A second account, dis-
cussed in Part B, involves an abductive inference from the success 
of science. According to this account, there is reason to think that 
the individuation schemes of the natural sciences correspond to the 
way reality is individuated intrinsically, because such a correspon-
dence could explain the success of natural science. A third account, 
considered in Part C, involves the confirmation of theory by data. 
According to this account, given rival individuation schemes, empiri-
cal observation can confirm which scheme is reality's own, or at least 
disconfirm those that are not. I argue that these particular strategies 
are wanting, and suggest in Part D that no independent criterion is 
available in principle. 
Part A: Individuation-Defining Properties 
Natural Properties 
One indirect strategy for Individuative Realism involves the thesis 
that certain elite properties determine the objects into which reality is 
individuated intrinsically. If we can find these properties, so the story 
goes, then reality's inherent joints will follow. We can approach this 
thesis by agreeing that there are many objects in the world, such as 
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bears, mountains, and molecules, and many properties too, such as the 
properties of being red, hot, or slippery. One factor that distinguishes 
clearly distinguishable things, such as bears and mountains, is that they 
do not share salient properties. Whereas bears have the properties of 
being alive, mobile, and weighing less than one ton, mountains have 
the properties of being inanimate, immobile, and weighing thousands 
of tons. Properties do indeed distinguish natural things. What compli-
cates matters is that reality can be individuated variously depending 
on which properties are privileged. As an illustration, imagine a world 
consisting of ten objects: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6 ,7 , 8, and 9. There are many 
ways to classify these objects. There is the set of objects with the prop-
erty 'pointed': {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9}. There is the set of objects bearing 
the property 'symmetrical when cut horizontally in half: {0, 3, 8}. 
There is the set of objects with the property 'symmetrical when cut 
vertically in half: {0, 8}. There is the set of objects with the property 
'encloses a space': {0, 4, 6, 8, 9). And so on ad infinitum. 
Regarding the abundance of properties, David Lewis writes: 
"Properties carve reality at the joints—and everywhere else as well."2 
"Among all the countless things and classes that there are," Lewis 
writes, "most are miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill-demarcated."3 
However, Lewis maintains that "an elite minority [of things and 
classes] are carved at the joints". 4 Now the crucial question: WHiich 
objects and/or kinds of objects have inherently natural boundaries? 
One strategy for answering this question is suggested (though per-
haps not ultimately defended) by Lewis, which is that reality's inher-
ent individuation scheme is established by "an elite minority of spe-
cial properties" which he calls "natural properties."5 There is, accord-
ing to Lewis, "an objective difference between natural and unnatural 
properties", though it "admits of degree." 6 The hope, at least as far 
as the Individuative Realist is concerned, is that the way reality is 
2 David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 4 (December 1983), p. 346. 
3 David Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 62, 
no. 3 (September 1984), p. 227. 
4 Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox", p. 227. 
5 Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", p. 346. See also p. 371. See 
also "Putnam's Paradox", p. 227. 
6 Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", p. 347. 
Carving Nature at its Inherent Joints 5 
individuated intrinsically falls out of the distribution of natural prop-
erties. The former is a function of the latter. Lewis emphasizes that 
it is not the case that natural properties are natural because they are 
privileged by us, or in his words, "that we confer naturalness on prop-
erties when we happen to take an interest in them." 7 If that were 
the case, then the naturalness of natural properties would be a func-
tion of something about us—and thus they would not be inherently 
natural. Rather, what makes properties natural has to be something 
about the intrinsic nature of reality. 
So what are the natural properties? Lewis does not provide a pro-
cess for determining this, but instead defers to experts capable of 
making the discriminations: "[PJhysics discovers properties. And not 
just any properties—natural properties."8 Lewis elaborates: 
To a physicalist like myself, the most plausible inegalitarianism 
seems to be the one that gives a special elite status to the 'funda-
mental physical properties': mass, charge, quark color and flavour, 
. . . (It is up to physics to discover these properties, and name them; 
physicalists will think that present-day physics at least comes close 
to providing a correct and complete list.) (. . .) Indeed, physics 
discovers which things and classes are the most elite of all.9 
According to this view, the fundamental properties discovered by 
physics delimit the things and kinds of things into which reality is 
individuated intrinsically. 
The Paradox 
According to Catherine Elgin, the claim that physicists discover 
natural properties breeds a famous paradox: 
Lewis's conviction that the naturalness of properties is indepen-
dent of and antecedent to scientific inquiry recalls the Euthy-
phro problem. (. . .) Does science favor particular properties 
because they are natural, or are they natural because science 
favors them.1 0 
7 Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", p. 377. 
8 Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", p. 365. 
9Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox", p. 228. 
1 0 Catherine Z. Elgin, "Unnatural Science", The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, 
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If science favors certain properties because those properties are 
natural, then it still remains to be shown that those properties are 
natural. Put rhetorically, In virtue of what are the properties reputed 
to be natural 'natural'? The answer cannot be that it is in virtue of 
the fact that science favors them, because then we are back to the 
question, Does science favor particular properties because they are 
natural, or are they natural because science favors them? Rather, the 
answer must be in virtue of something about the intrinsic nature of 
reality. 
In a recent article, Mary Kate McGowan critically considers the 
possibility that there is a "single objective way that the world is," 
which is "entirely independent of us," and which is determined by 
something equivalent to Lewis' natural properties, called "base struc-
ture-defining properties" by McGowan." McGowan articulates the 
challenge to this thesis as follows: 
In virtue of what is a structure-defining property structure 
defining—us or the world? The [Individuative Realist] maintains 
that the structure-defining status of properties is an entirely 
objective matter while the non-realist maintains instead that we 
somehow make a property structure-defining.12 
The crux, as McGowan puts it above, is explaining how "the struc-
ture-defining status of properties is an entirely objective matter". 
McGowan explicates an account of natural properties which 
appeals to the hierarchical series of connections between superve-
nient and base properties.1 3 According to this account, every higher 
level property supervenes, either directly or indirectly, on a base, 
structural level. This is just to say that there cannot be a physical 
change in a higher level without a corresponding change in the lower 
level upon which that higher level supervenes. Though there are 
no. 6 (June 1995), p. 299. 
1 1 Mary Kate McGowan, "The Neglected Controversy Over Metaphysical 
Realism", Philosophy 11 (January 2002), pp. 14-16. 
1 2 McGowan, "The Neglected Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism", 
p. 7. 1 have replaced her 'Metaphysical Realism' with 'Individuative Realism', 
since the positions seem to be equivalent. 
1 1 This is a strategy that Lewis suggests, but does not develop, in "Putnam's 
Paradox", p. 228. 
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many property levels, each supervening on the one below, they all 
bottom out on this base level. For example, the property of being 
a piece of wood supervenes on lower-level molecular structure, 
which in turn supervenes on lower-level atomic structure, and so on 
down to the base structure-defining properties (whatever they are). 
This base determines the "single objective way that the world is", 
and permits "(the possibility of) a single correct description of the 
world. The description that accurately describes the unique-ish base 
is ultimately correct in virtue of accurately describing the world in 
its utmost detail." 1 4 Such a description could cut reality at its inher-
ent joints. 
Even if the supervenience model is accurate—that is, even if 
there are supervening property levels, such that there cannot be a 
physical change in a higher level without a corresponding change in 
the lower level—it is not clear that it would help the Individuative 
Realist. As McGowan points out, the promise of this strategy rests 
on the assumption that the world is finitely complex. If the world 
is infinitely complex, then there is no end to the supervenience, 
and thus no base level. But even if the world is finitely complex, and 
there are base structure-defining properties, it is unclear how to iso-
late them. There could, unbeknownst to us, always be a lower level 
of structure-defining properties upon which any ostensibly lowest 
level supervenes. Thus, even if the base level is attainable, it could 
still be unknowable as such. As McGowan puts it, "one might argue 
against [Individuative Realism] on the grounds that an objective but 
ultimately unknowable world is not worth presupposing in the first 
place." 1 5 
Conclusion to Part A 
The natural property account maintains that some objects and/ 
or kinds of objects are inherently natural in virtue of their being a 
function of certain elite properties. The primary objection to this 
back door route to the individuation inherent in nature is that it just 
seems to shift the burden of proof back a step. How do we know 
how reality is individuated intrinsically? It is a function of natural 
1 4 McGowan, "The Neglected Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism", p. 16. 
1 5 McGowan, "The Neglected Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism", p. 17. 
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properties. An analogous dialectic runs as follows. God exists. How 
do I know? An angel told me. Though natural properties could con-
ceivably account for one mystery (how reality is individuated intrin-
sically), they are themselves another mystery. Elgin draws a stronger 
conclusion which provides a nice segue into part B: 
Nothing confers naturalness on properties but their contribu-
tion to successful science. Properties are natural, then, only 
because natural science favors them. Naturalness of properties 
is an output of successful inquiry, not an input into it. 1 6 
Contrary to Elgin, could it be that the success of science provides 
reason to think that the individuation science recognizes corre-
sponds to inherently natural divisions? The next part considers this 
possibility. 
Part B : Explaining the Success of Science 
The Abductive Inference 
Another indirect strategy for Individuative Realism involves an 
abductive inference. According to the argument, (A) a correspon-
dence between (1) the individuation schemes of the natural sciences 
and (2) the way reality is individuated intrinsically, could explain 
(B) the astonishing success of science. That (A), which is inferred, 
could explain (B), which seems in need of explaining, is what makes 
(A) a plausible inference. The promise of this abductive inference is 
that explanatory efficacy entails truth, as it often does. The inferred 
truth is that the individuation schemes of science correspond to the 
way reality is individuated intrinsically. 
There are pitfalls in the use and interpretation of this argu-
ment that need to be avoided before a proper assessment can take 
place. These pitfalls involve (1) the role of the 'because' and (2) the 
construal of 'success'. Regarding (1), consider a statement resem-
bling an abductive argument: Ether puts people to sleep because 
it has dormitive power. The statement seems explanatory since 
something happens (ether puts people to sleep) because of some-
thing else (ether has dormitive power). However, the latter merely 
1 6 Elgin, "Unnatural Science", p. 300. 
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qualifies (or paraphrases) the former, rather than explains it. To say 
'ether has dormitive power' is just to say 'ether puts people to sleep'. 
It is important that the inference supporting Individuative Realism 
is actually explanatory, and not merely qualificatory, since it is the 
promise of explanatory efficacy that makes the inference compel-
ling in the first place. The statement 'natural science has been suc-
cessful because its individuation schemes correspond to the way 
reality is individuated intrinsically' can be read as a qualification, 
if 'success' is construed as correspondence between scheme and 
reality. Here is the translation: 'natural science has been successful, 
which is just to say that its individuation schemes correspond to the 
way reality is individuated intrinsically.' However, 'success' cannot 
be so defined without begging the central question. Imagine this 
were the argument: 
Premise 1: The measure of success for a practice is correspon-
dence between its individuation schemes and the way 
reality is individuated intrinsically. 
Premise 2: The natural sciences have been successful. 
Conclusion: The individuation schemes of the natural sciences 
correspond to the way reality is individuated intrinsically. 
This appears to be a deductive argument. If the premises are true, 
and 'success' is being used consistently, then the conclusion seems 
to follow necessarily. However, the premises are dubious since they 
assume that science has been successful in the sense that needs to be 
shown. 
An alternative formulation of the argument from success is infer-
ential and involves a different definition of success. This improved 
argument is that the natural sciences have been successful at predic-
tion, control, and contribution to technological advancement, because their 
individuation schemes correspond to the way reality is individuated 
intrinsically. In this argument, the clause after the 'because' does 
not appear to be a qualification of the clause before the 'because'. In 
other words, the presumed explanans does not appear to be a mere 
paraphrase of the presumed explanandum, which suggests that the 
argument is at least a valid abductive inference. Here is the improved 
argument schematized: 
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Premise: The natural sciences have been increasingly successful 
at prediction, control, and contribution to technologi-
cal advancement. 
[Implicit question: what explains the premise?] 
Conclusion: The individuation schemes of the natural sciences 
correspond to the way reality is individuated intrinsically. 
Assessing the Abductive Inference 
The conclusion of the abductive inference schematized above is 
that reality is individuated intrinsically and it is as the natural sciences 
describe it. The argument does not merely conclude along with Scien-
tific Realism that the entities referred to and postulated by the natural 
sciences exist. Individuative Realism is stronger than Scientific Real-
ism (so construed), since Individuative Realism requires not just that 
certain individual entities and/or kinds of entities exist, but that they 
are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of our 
gerrymandering. The key distinction here Is between things that exist 
and things that have boundaries that inhere in nature independent of 
where we draw the lines. For instance, mountains exist, but they do 
not have inherently natural boundaries. The same goes for the stripes 
of a rainbow. The point is that if the abductive inference from the suc-
cess of science cannot support Scientific Realism, it certainly cannot 
support the more stringent Individuative Realism. Many unobserv-
able scientific postulates that were (and perhaps still are) explanato-
rily efficacious, such as the bodily humors, phlogiston, the physiologi-
cal vital force, and electromagnetic and optical ethers, turned out not 
to exist after all.17 Though as Larry Laudan concludes, "a theory's suc-
cess is no warrant for the claim that all or most of its central terms 
refer", 1 8 it of course does not follow that no scientific terms refer. 
Now the crucial question: Could a correspondence between the 
individuation schemes of science and the way reality is individuated 
intrinsically explain the success of science? The abductive inference-
1 7 Larry Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", in Scientific Real-
ism, edited by Jarett Leplin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 
p. 231. 
1 8 Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", p. 244. 
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is initially plausible. Accurate descriptions are often major factors 
in the success of an endeavor. For instance, getting from point A 
to point B is often expedited with an accurate map. Imagine that a 
driver had always relied exclusively on verbal directions gleaned at gas 
stations en route to far and remote destinations. He would occasion-
ally proceed in the wrong direction, confuse memorized directions, 
forget crucial details, and generally travel inefficiently. Imagine now 
that he starts using accurate and detailed road maps and attains his 
destinations far faster than before, while reducing expenses on gas, 
food, and accommodations. What would account for his newfound 
success? His use of the maps. All things equal, this fact would explain 
his more efficient travel. 
The abductive inference in support of Individuative Realism is 
similar, except that something is inferred to explain something else. 
That scientists have an accurate map (what is inferred) could go a 
long way toward explaining their success. A significant disanalogy 
involves the terrain. In the driving case, the terrain is primarily roads 
and significant landmarks. A map's accuracy can be verified by com-
parison with the terrain. In the case of Individuative Realism, it is 
not antecedently known whether reality has its own inherent indi-
viduation scheme to which the individuation schemes of science can 
be compared. It is both (1) a correspondence to (2) the way reality is 
individuated intrinsically, that is inferred. The strength of the infer-
ence depends on its ability to explain the success of science; and 
there is reason to think it can do so only weakly. 
The driving example can help demonstrate that possessing an 
accurate map, either of roads or the way reality is individuated 
intrinsically, would not reliably explain success. A could reliably be 
inferred from an occurrence of B, if A is a necessary condition of B. 
A could less reliably be inferred from an occurrence of B, if A is only 
a sufficient condition for B. However, in the driving example, having 
an accurate road map is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion for attaining the destination. It is not a necessary condition, 
because the destination can be attained without an accurate map, 
and it is not a sufficient condition, because having an accurate map 
does not guarantee attainment of the destination. There are only 
certain cases in which attaining one's destination is caused and thus 
explained by using an accurate map. 
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Analogously, if a correspondence between the individuation 
schemes of science and the way reality is individuated intrinsically is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of sci-
ence, then it is not necessarily the case that such a correspondence 
would explain the success of science. First, is such a correspondence 
a necessary condition for the success of science? If it is true that 
central terms of successful scientific theories have not referred to 
anything real, then an isomorphism between the schemes of science 
and reality is evidently not a necessary condition for the success of 
science. Second, is such a correspondence a sufficient condition for 
the success of science? A negative answer can be supported by anal-
ogy to the driving example. Were a road map perfectly accurate, it 
would have to be incredibly detailed. Not only would it have to rep-
resent the useful details, such as roads, major topographical forma-
tions, and towns, but all details, including the precise locations of 
blades of grass, pebbles, and insects. That the latter details are not 
in our interest is irrelevant, since what matters is that the map be 
perfectly accurate. Were the map, like most road maps, printed on 
paper, then it would be large, perhaps even as large as the reality it 
depicts. Would having such a perfectly accurate map be a sufficient 
condition for—that is, would it guarantee—success, which in the driv-
ing case entails attaining the destination in a timely manner? Prob-
ably not, and the enormity and complexity of the map would be a 
likely cause of failure. In order for a map to be useful, it has to be 
imperfect, depicting only certain features of reality—and those in 
only minimal detail—that conduce to our interest in getting around. 
Could an individuation scheme that cuts reality at its inherent 
joints also be of limited use, if not downright encumbering, for sci-
entists? The answer of course depends on how reality is actually indi-
viduated. If the inference is true that reality is intrinsically individu-
ated in the way science individuates it, then the answer is evidently 
no. However, if the way in which reality is individuated intrinsically 
is extremely complex, then a perfectly accurate map of it could con-
ceivably, as in the driving case, be of limited use. The point is that a 
correspondence between scheme and reality is not necessarily a suf-
ficient condition for scientific success. Couple this with the conclu-
sion that such a correspondence is not a necessary condition for sci-
entific success, and it seems that a correspondence between scheme 
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and reality is not obviously the best or even a viable explanation of 
the success of science. 
A major hurdle for the abductive inference from the success of 
science is making the causal connection between success and cor-
respondence. I have argued that a correspondence between the 
individuation schemes of science and the way reality is individuated 
intrinsically could not obviously explain the success of science. But 
let us give Individuative Realism the benefit of the doubt and assume 
for the sake of argument that a correspondence between scheme and 
reality could explain the success of science. Now the question is this: 
If a correspondence between scheme and reality could explain the 
success of science, would reliable knowledge about the way reality 
is individuated intrinsically be in the offing? In other words, would 
explanatory efficacy in this case yield truth? One reason to think 
not is that explanatory efficacy is itself not, especially in the history 
of science, a reliable indicator of truth. Many unobservable entities 
inferred by scientific theory, which were explanatorily powerful, did 
not exist. Following Arthur Fine, since abductive inference has been 
unreliable on a case by case basis in the history of science, it is unrea-
sonable to think it would be any more reliable in extremely general 
cases, such as the case of Individuative Realism.1 9 
Conclusion to Part B 
Part B examined an abductive inference in support of Individu-
ative Realism. The argument is that an inferred correspondence 
[between (1) the individuation schemes of the natural sciences and (2) 
the also inferred way reality is individuated intrinsically] could explain 
the success of science. There are two major problems with this argu-
ment. First, it does not seem that such a correspondence could readily 
explain the success of science, since such a correspondence seehis 
neither to be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of 
science. Second, even if such a correspondence could readily explain 
the success of science, there is reason to think that explanatory effi-
cacy is not a reliable indicator of truth in the relevant domain. 
"Arthur Fine, "The Natural Ontological Attitude", in The Philosophy of Sci-
ence, edited by Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J . D. Trout (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1991). See especially pp. 262-263. 
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Part C: Confirmability and Simplicity 
Confirmation 
A third indirect strategy for Individuative Realism involves dis-
confirming the wrong individuation schemes and confirming the 
right schemes by repeated empirical observation. As an illustration 
of how this is supposed to work, imagine that a portion of reality 
appears like the following 9x9 grid: 
Figure I: A Hypothetical Section 
of Reality 
The pressing question for the Individuative Realist is how this area 
is individuated intrinsically. In other words, what are the boundar-
ies that matter intrinsically? The obvious answer is that the intrinsi-
cally important boundaries are the ones demarcating the 81 squares, 
though there are many less obvious boundaries. The grid could be 
divided horizontally, vertically, or diagonally in half. Additionally, 
each of the 81 squares could themselves be divided in these ways. 
And so on ad infinitum. How could it be determined which of these 
boundaries are intrinsically important? One way of determining this 
is by observing what actually transpires in the region—by observing 
how things interact and interrelate. 
Entertain the following story about our hypothetical world. 
One day to the surprise of scientists and laymen alike, a few things 
appeared on the previously blank grid in rapid succession. The end 
result is depicted in the following figure: 
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X o 
X 
o o X 
X X o 
Figure 2: First Observation 
Proponents of the 81-square scheme took the observation as confir-
mation of their theory that the region is individuated intrinsically 
into the 81 visible squares. Incidentally, they also thought the appear-
ance of nine letters was significant, since nine squared is 81. Other 
scientists interpreted the observations as evidence that the grid is 
ultimately divided into 'square pairs', each comprised of two adja-
cent squares and each containing an X/O pair. However, they were 
at a loss to account for the anomalous single X in the upper left of 
the grid. 
Then, without warning, the Xs and Os were suddenly rearranged, 
as follows: 
X 
o X 
o 
X 
o X 
o o Figure 3: Second Observation 
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Unlike the first time, after the Xs and Os appeared in place, a strange 
phenomenon occurred: a line, characterized by some observers as a 
lightning bolt, flashed through and connected the three Os on the 
left side of the grid. Scientists took this second arrangement of Xs 
and Os to be disconfirming evidence for the 'square pair' scheme, 
since only two of the letters were adjacent this time, and they were 
not even an X/O pair, as they all had been before. Though the pro-
ponents of the 81-square scheme felt their scheme had been further 
confirmed, they could not account for the linear flash. 
Around this time an article in a leading science journal reported 
a pattern observed in both events. Though the X s and Os had 
appeared in rapid succession, in both events they alternated. 
Upon hearing this, the scientist, whose fame was at that moment 
forged, exclaimed: "Oh my God . . . it's tic-tac-toe!" Sure enough, 
the data from the two observations, and every observation there-
after (trust me), confirmed the theory. Superimposing the true 
grid lines onto the observed arrangements makes it clear that 
tic-tac-toe was indeed the name of the game: 
X o 
X 
o o X 
X X o 
X X O 
o o X 
X X O 
Figure 4: First Observation Converted to True Scheme 
Though it initially seemed that the borders around all 81 squares 
were important, in part because the Xs and Os appeared within those 
borders, it turned out that only the borders around the 9 squares in 
bold in the converted grids above really mattered. Thereby, through 
observation and analysis, the rival individuation schemes were dis-
confirmed, and the 3x3 scheme confirmed. 
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Figure 5: Second Observation Converted to True Scheme 
The point of the tic-tac-toe example is to show how the cor-
rectness of an individuation scheme can be confirmed by repeated 
empirical observation—how repeated empirical observation can 
confirm which boundaries are intrinsically real, and disconfirm the 
rest. But the deck is stacked in favor of Individuative Realism in this 
example. Whereas the purpose of tic-tac-toe is known antecedently, 
the purpose of natural displays, such as observed phenomena in 
outer space, is not. In addition, the rules of tic-tac-toe were devised 
by people, whereas the laws of nature were not. Thereby, in this par-
ticular example, we might be confusing the borders that matter to 
us with the borders that matter intrinsically—and the Individuative 
Realist is solely concerned with the latter. So perhaps a good shuffle 
of the deck can yield an example which avoids these biases. 
Confirmation and Underdetermination 
Consider the following ways of individuating a particular hunk 
of reality. The first individuation scheme (IS 1) includes the follow-
ing three individuals: the earth, moon, and sun. The second (IS2) 
includes six individuals: earthhalfl, earthhalf2, moonhalfl, moon-
half2, sunhalfl, and sunhalf2, where earthhalfl and earthhalf2 jointly 
comprise what we call the earth, and so on. The third (IS3) includes 
two individuals, the earth and the moonandsun, the latter of which is 
a single object jointly comprised of what we separately call the moon 
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and the sun. These are different ways of individuating reality. Now, 
can empirical observation confirm that one of these individuation 
schemes cuts reality at its inherent joints, or disconfirm at least one 
of the others? 
Consider the observation of a lunar eclipse where, in the lingo of 
IS 1, the earth passes between the moon and the sun, thereby shading 
the moon. Evidently this observation can be expressed in IS 1, but 
can it be expressed in IS2 and/or IS3 without signifying the individu-
als of IS 1 ? The answer is affirmative for IS2: when earthhalfl and 
earthhalf2 jointly pass between the conjunction of sunhalfl and sun-
half2 and the conjunction of moonhalfl and moonhalf2, an eclipse 
of moonhalfl and moonhalf2 is observed. Now how about IS3? It is 
questionable whether the lunar eclipse is expressible in the idiom 
of IS3, because describing and explaining the eclipse requires dis-
tinguishing between what we call the sun and moon, but they are 
conflated in IS3. More specifically, in order to describe the eclipse, 
the earth has to be described as passing between things. However, in 
IS3 there are not multiple things between which the earth can pass, 
only the single object 'moonandsun'. This is perhaps a manageable 
obstacle for IS3, since single things (such as basketballs and footballs) 
can pass through other single things (such as hoops and goal posts). 
For the sake of argument, assume that the moonandsun is such that 
the earth can pass through i t Even with this concession a distinction 
is still required between two parts of the hoop, the fluorescent (sun) 
part and the shaded (moon) part. Though this may not decisively 
disconfirm IS3, one suspects that some individuation schemes would 
be disconfirmed by the observation of a lunar eclipse—perhaps an 
individuation scheme that made no distinction between the earth, 
moon, or sun. 
Regardless of which if any schemes are disconfirmed, the impor-
tant point is that both IS1 and IS2 seem equally well-confirmed by 
the data. More importantly, there are indefinitely more individua-
tion schemes that, like IS2, subdivide the earth, moon, and sun in 
finer and finer ways. Consequently, any observation that confirms 
IS2 will also confirm all the other individuation schemes that, like 
IS2, acknowledge the macro-level distinction between the earth, 
moon, and sun, but further subdivide each. This is an instance of the 
underdetermination of theory by data—the rival theories being rival 
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individuation schemes. Empirical observation cannot adjudicate 
decisively between these many rival individuation schemes, since (so 
the story goes) any observation that confirms one scheme will also 
confirm the finer permutations of that scheme. 
The underdetermination of individuation schemes, if valid, puts 
us right back where we started, with many individuation schemes 
and no independent criterion for determining which cuts reality 
at its inherent joints. Criteria such as being determined by natural 
properties, explanatory efficacy, and confirmability seem insuffi-
cient. Are there any others? 
Simplicity 
A possible criterion for determining which of two equally well-
confirmed individuation schemes gets reality right is simplicity. In 
the eclipse example, (IS1) the scheme that individuates reality into 
the earth, moon, and sun is more intuitively simple than (IS2) the 
scheme that individuates reality into moonhalfl, moonhalf2, earth-
halfl, earthhalf2, sunhalfl, and sunhalf2. (IS1) is prima facie simpler 
than (IS2), in part because the former scheme is familiar, but also 
because the former scheme is more ontologically parsimonious: it 
employs three objects rather than six. 
The claim that simplicity (as ontological parsimony) favors famil-
iar individuation schemes can, however, be challenged by a cleverly 
chosen example. Consider an individuation scheme (IS4) that recog-
nizes two individuals: the moonsun and the earthsun. 2 0 The moon-
sun is an object that is either the moon or the sun, and the earthsun 
is an object that is either the earth or the sun. The lunar eclipse can 
be described using only these 'individuals' as follows: when the earth-
sun that is not the moonsun passes directly between (1) that which is 
shared by the earthsun and the moonsun and (2) the moonsun that 
is not the earthsun, an eclipse is observed. It thereby seems that this 
bizarre individuation scheme is confirmed, or at least not discon-
firmed, by the-eclipse. Now to the point. The salient feature of this 
2 0 This example and its intended force is inspired by a kindred example in 
Eli Hirsch, Dividing Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 80-
81. Sophie R. Allen also discusses Hirsch's example in "Deepening the Contro-
versy over Metaphysical Realism", Philosophy 77 (October 2002), pp. 525-526. 
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bizarre individuation scheme is that it requires only two 'individuals' 
(the moonsun and the earthsun), while the familiar scheme employs 
three individuals (the moon, earth, and sun), thereby making the 
former more ontologically parsimonious than the latter. 
Or is it? It is worth considering that the individuation scheme 
comprised of the moonsun and earthsun is an illegitimate individu-
ation scheme. The familiar individuation scheme comprised of the 
earth, moon, and sun individuates reality by dividing reality into 
three discrete individuals. The individuation scheme comprised of 
moonhalfl, moonhalf2, earthhalfl, earthhalf2, sunhalfl, and sun-
half2 also individuates reality into what are, at least upon reflection, 
fairly discrete individuals. Were the earth divided in two, the result-
ing halves could conceivably be distinct, non-overlapping individuals. 
However, the earthsun (the object comprised of the earth or the 
sun) and the moonsun (the object comprised of the moon or the 
sun) are not discrete, individual objects in anything approaching the 
ordinary sense of the word 'individual'. 
Even if familiar individuation schemes are also the simplest (in 
terms of ontological parsimony), their qualifications for matching 
the way reality is individuated intrinsically would be no more evident, 
since there is no obvious reason to presume that ontological parsimony 
is an indicator of inherence. In virtue of what does the ontological 
parsimony of an individuation scheme entail that it cuts reality at its 
inherent joints? It seems that once again the desideratum is a decisive, 
albeit elusive, independent criterion. Furthermore, regardless of how 
'simplicity' is construed, it seems ineligible as an indicator of inher-
ence, since its being so would make inherence a function of something 
about us—namely, what we find simple. And the way reality is individu-
ated intrinsically—as long as the notion 'intrinsic' is taken seriously—is 
supposed to be totally independent of anything about us. 2 1 
Underdetermination Undermined? 
Thus far, it has been entertained that many individuation 
schemes are equally well-confirmed by the data—in other words, 
2 1 Elgin makes this point regarding natural properties in "Unnatural Sci-
ence", pp. 292-293. 
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that individuation schemes are underdetermined by the data. I 
now want to raise an objection to the underdetermination thesis 
as it relates to Individuative Realism. Though it may be the case in 
theory that theories are underdetermined by the data, this is not 
always true in practice. Consider the following illustration. At the 
Grand Teton Climber's Ranch, you notice that Jim and Ryan have 
a vast array of climbing and camping gear spread out and are care-
fully packing two enormous backpacks. They are wearing moun-
taineering boots, chugging water, and applying gobs of sunscreen. 
You inquire about their activity and Jim casts his gaze toward the 
granite peaks high above. Based on this data, you infer that they 
are momentarily embarking on a multi-day mountaineering excur-
sion, though you are unable to speculate about their trail of ascent, 
base camp location, or climbing itinerary. Your theory about their 
impending trip is thereby underdetermined by the available data. 
Such underdetermination is irrelevant for your purposes, though. 
Since you were intending to invite Jim and Ryan to dinner, their 
imminent departure rules out their dining with you, which is all 
you need to know. The preceding example generalizes. The under-
determination of theory is often inconsequential, because for our 
purposes we need details, but not every detail. As long as a theory 
provides sufficient detail, then its being underdetermined, and 
hence compatible with an array of theories varying on insignificant 
details, is irrelevant. Now the question: Is the alleged underdeter-
mination of individuation schemes irrelevant to Individuative Real-
ism as well? 
The important point raised above is that for our interests and 
purposes the underdetermination of theory is often irrelevant. 
However, our interests and purposes cannot be deciding factors 
in determining how reality is individuated intrinsically. The Indi-
viduative Realist aims to find reality's inherent joints; as inherent, 
the location of these joints has to be totally independent of—not 
in any way a function of—our interests and purposes. It cannot 
be for Individuative Realism, as it is in more mundane pursuits, 
that our interests and purposes determine which level of detail in 
a theory (or in this case, an individuation scheme) is sufficient, 
thereby rendering vast numbers of subtle permutations of theory 
irrelevant. 
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Conclusion to Part C 
The confirmation of individuation schemes by empirical observa-
tion appears inadequate for determining how reality is individuated 
intrinsically, since the same empirical observations confirm many 
individuation schemes - that is, individuation schemes are underde-
termined by the data. Simplicity is not a viable criterion for finding 
the one right individuation scheme either, since simplicity is a func-
tion of our interests and purposes, which are precisely what needs 
to be factored out of the equation (so long as the notion 'intrinsic' is 
taken seriously). Finally, though in practice the underdetermination 
of theory is often inconsequential, since the many permutations on 
a general theory are irrelevant to our interests and purposes, this 
exemption does not apply for Individuative Realism, since the way 
reality is individuated intrinsically cannot depend on anthropocentric 
factors (again, so long as the notion 'intrinsic' is taken seriously). 
Part D: Conclusion 
In the introduction, I suggested that the challenge faced by Indi-
viduative Realism is analogous to finding a key that matches a par-
ticular keyhole. A match cannot be determined 'directly' by simply 
comparing or otherwise visually inspecting the key and keyhole. 
Rather, a match must be determined 'indirectly' by something other 
than direct observation—namely, the unlatching of the lock. The 
unlatching of the lock is an independent criterion for determining 
a match between key and keyhole. This paper critically considered 
several such independent criteria for determining a match between 
our individuation schemes and the way reality is individuated intrin-
sically, including the individuation scheme's being (1) a function 
of natural properties, (2) able to explain the success of science, (3) 
confirmed by empirical observation, and (4) simple. Though each of 
these strategies was reviewed unfavorably, there are probably ways 
of construing or tweaking them that could get around the specific, 
objections raised in this paper. Such ancillary debates could probably 
go on forever. I suspect that real progress in the debate can instead 
be made by considering the general strategy under which the par-
ticular strategies are subsumed. 
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There is reason to think that the general strategy of finding an 
independent criterion for determining which individuation schemes 
cut reality at its inherent joints is untenable. The reason for this can 
be understood by analogy to the key and keyhole case. In the key 
and keyhole case, we know antecedently (1) that there are keys, (2) 
that there is a keyhole, and (3) what happens when there is a match 
between key and keyhole (the lock opens). The only unknown is 
which key matches the keyhole. The situation for Individuative Real-
ism is significantly different. We know that there are individuation 
schemes. However, we do not know (1) which individuation schemes 
cut reality at its inherent joints, (2) what happens when there is a 
match (the independent criterion), or even (3) that reality is individ-
uated intrinsically. One known and three unknowns in an equation 
is a recipe for skepticism. 
The challenge faced by the Individuative Realist can perhaps 
more profitably be understood by contrast with another mundane 
case. Imagine that we are trying to guess the length of a lobster just 
by looking at it. Everyone has a different guess. How do we deter-
mine who, if anyone, is right? By consulting an agreed upon standard 
of measurement, such as a ruler or caliper. It is here where things 
appear especially grim for the Individuative Realist. Consulting an 
agreed upon standard is not an option for the Individuative Real-
ist, since that would make the purportedly intrinsic boundaries a 
function of something about us—namely, our agreement. Wnereas 
in ordinary life it is perfectly acceptable that our objective standards 
are actually intersubjective—that is, a function of widespread agree-
ment - in the case of Individuative Realism, an acceptable standard 
would have to be purely objective—that is, totally independent of 
our intersubjective conventions (so long as the notion 'intrinsic' is 
taken seriously). Thus it seems that the standard required by Indi-
viduative Realism is beyond our reach. And if so, then even if reality 
is individuated intrinsically, we cannot know how it is individuated 
intrinsically.22 
2 21 would like to thank Eric Schwitzgebel and especially Peter Graham for 
many helpful comments and conversations about various drafts of this paper. 
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